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Schopenhauer’s Transcendental Problem
Alex Enescu, Concordia University

The more clearly you become conscious of the frailty, vanity and dream
like quality of all things, the more clearly will you also become conscious
of the eternity of your own inner being. (Schopenhauer, Aphroism V)

In The World As Will And Idea, Schopenhauer tells us that the self—the real
self—is not our corporal identity, or perceptual sense of ego, but a will with "an existence for itself” (15). The will is a force that extends beyond the organic body, it is the
inner essence of a being. In his Essays and Aphorism, Schopenhauer declares that
death is not the end of life, but the end of a particular existence (Aphorism IV). Scho
penhauer’s philosophy presents us with an inherent paradox—what exactly is it that
survives bodily death? To understand this we must look at Schopenhauer’s Vedic (more
particularly Upanishadic) heritage along with the few fragmentary Buddhist text he had
access to. The Upanishads and Vedanta literature affirms the immortality of self in the
transcendental notion of atman. Buddhists, on the other hand, reject any notion of true
self or immortal essence while simultaneously supporting the doctrine of metempsychosis'. The paradox is similar to Schopenhauer’s—what survives death if the self is illuso
ry? The Buddhist believe that reincarnation is a karmic process that excludes personal
identity. Schopenhauer’s understanding of will (an indestructible essence that survives
The philosophic Greek term denoting the transmigration of the soul, or essence, of a person into another
living being at death. The term is very similar to the theological notion known as reincarnation in Hindu
ism; but dissimilar to the one found in Buddhism, which often denotes a transference of karma at death
instead of essence or soul.
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death), on the other hand, is a concept developed from the Vedic Brahman (Dauer, 78). This provides an important clue that will enable a better understanding of the origin
of Schopenhauer’s paradox. In the following essay I will show that Schopenhauer’s will
more closely resembles the Vedic notion of a transcendental self—essence or soul—
than the Buddhist notion of residual karmic metempsychosis.
In his anecdotal work, Essays and Aphorisms, Schopenhauer presents us with a
philosophy that posits the will—the inner self—as the primary manifestation of the thingin-itself (Aphorism III). Robert Wicks tells us that the "thing-in-itself [...] is the ultimate
ground of the object’s transcendental foundation” (47). The thing-in-itself is the primary
force behind every subjective being and objective manifestation. Not realizing that all
phenomenal existence emerges from the will, or its higher emanation the thing-in-itself,
is the fundamental mistake at the core of all philosophies (Aphorism III). The truth, ac
cording to Schopenhauer, lies in the fact that "intellect and matter are correlatives i.e.,
that the one exists only for the other, both stand and fall together, the one is only the
reflexion of the other, and indeed they are really the same thing” (World, 22). This idea
is not dissimilar to the all-encompassing Vedic notion of Brahman, as we will later see.
In The World as Will and Idea, Schopenhauer says that will is "the knowledge a
priori of the body, and the body is the knowledge a posteriori of the will” (33). The former "is not in space and time, for it is whole and undivided, in every percipient being”
(21), while the latter is the very form of space and time (21). We live in a universe that is
exploring itself through the subjective and objective manifestations of the same self—
the same will—in infinite variations.
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For Schopenhauer, all phenomena are subject to the realm of time. In this view,
death "merely affects the individual” (23) and not the real self. "From this it follows that
the existence of [one’s] body as something extended and acting always presupposes a
knowing entity distinct from it” (5). Put differently, Schopenhauer sees the body as an
extending feature of an inner and discrete "knowing entity”. This knowing entity is both
beyond time and subjected to time simultaneously—through the manifestation of its
physical experience. Schopenhauer tells us that this inner entity is always accessible; to
reach it we must remove the forms—or illusions—of phenomenon "and all those forms
which are subordinate to it” (83). What we then discover is the essence of that distinct
entity, the all-encompassing will (83).
In the latter section of Schopenhauer’s fourth book in The World As Will and
Idea, we are told that the will is inherently different from personal identity. The self—
ego—is a product of the temporal world and therefore illusory. It is the ego that dies and
which "can extract [...] little nourishment and consolation” (184) from the temporal idea
of death. R. Raj Singh tells us that Schopenhauer’s philosophical "rejection of individualism” (90) is what leads him to declare the death of the ego. Robert Wicks adds that the
ego "produces a feeling of separation from other people and from reality as a whole, it is
a principle of the "I” [.. ] and my sense of finite individuality” (37). It is this false perception of separation from the rest of the universe that Schopenhauer denounces. Wicks
likens the illusion of ego to "ice cubes floating in a basin of water, that fail to realize how
they are constituted by the very water in which they [are] situated” (37). In this example,
water is the thing-in-itself or will—that which encompasses all things—and the ice cubs
are the illusory bodily identity that dissolves away at death.
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The same notion is directly referenced in Vedic literature. Singh tells us that: "according to Vedanta, individuality or ego (agam) and self-love (mamta or mineness) are
the traps for the worldly individual that take him or her further away from the real self
(atman)" (93). Atman is understood to be the eternal and unchangeable identity of every
being—an emanation of Brahman. Atman can be likened to will, while the thing-in-itself
to Brahman. Buddhists, however, reject this idea. They argue that "in fact there is no
self or ego; it is all a chimera" (93). Walpola Rahula tells us that for Buddhists the idea
of self is a fetter that leads to the notion "I AM" (Chapter V). This in turns leads to clinging, one of the main causes of suffering in Buddhism.
It is here that the transcendental problem of Schopenhauer becomes evident. “As
thing-in-itself everyone is timeless, and therefore endless" (World, 184)—as ego every
one is time bound and finite. The will, the emanation of the thing-in-itself, transcends
time and continues to exist after death, and not the individual ego—a false association
i.e., not the central essence, or identity of a person. "As thing-in-itself he is the will which
appears in everything" (World, 185), or the common force that enables all life to exist.
This is what Singh identifies as the "presence of something within us, which always was
and always will be" (122). In Schopenhauer’s view, the phenomenal world is an illusion,
what the Buddha would call "conditional things," (Rahula, The Last Words of The Buddha) which all end with death. This is why Schopenhauer declared that "death removes
the illusion which separates [our] consciousness from that of the others" (World, 185).
For Schopenhauer and Buddhism the ego’s corporal identity is temporary and
transient. According to Rahula, ego is "only a false belief, a mental projection" (Chapter
6, ¶ 17). For Schopenhauer it is the will—"the universal force" (Singh, 122)—that ena-
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bles our illusory identity to grow. It is the energy that drives corporal growth, as a particular phenomenon of that original force. It is for this reason that only the will, or inner
force, can strive for "immortality” (World, 185). It existed a priori to birth and will exist a
posteriori to death. Schopenhauer was aware of this logical inconsistency, voicing it in
his Essays And Aphorisms:
No, you can’t cheat me out of my individuality in that way. I
have stipulated that my individuality should continue to exist,
and I cannot be reconciled to its loss by mechanisms and phenomena. I, I, I want to exist! That is what I want, and not an existence I first have to be argued into believing I possess (Aphorism 8).
Thrasymachus frustration exemplifies the dichotomy between self and Schopenhauer’s
will. The transcendental problem is likewise found in Buddhism. Rahula asks: "If there
is no permanent, unchanging entity or substance like Self or Soul (atman), what is it that
can re-exist or be reborn after death” (Chapter 3, ¶16)?
When asked to account for the apparent inconsistency between the no-self doc
trine and reincarnation, the Buddha answered: "If we can understand that in this life we
can continue without a permanent, unchanging substance like ‘Self’ or ‘Soul,’ why can’t
we understand that those forces themselves can continue without a Self or a Soul be
hind them after the non-functioning of the body” (Chapter 3, ¶ 16)? Rahula tells us that
when the "physical body is no more capable of functioning, energies do not die with it,
but continue to take some other shape or form, which we call another life” (Chapter 3,
¶ 17). As Dorothea Dauer explains, "In the Buddhist theory of rebirth, emphasis is al-
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ways laid on karma” (18), instead of the individual. Rahula tells us that the Buddha
equated karma to volition (Chapter 2, ¶22), i.e., willing. In other words, it is the force, or
energy, of the act of willing which propagates the universe through karma. Dauer
agrees, "an individual is at one and the same time the generator of karma affecting the
next generation and the receiver of the karma accumulated by the previous generation”
(18). Our act of willing is determined by those who have preceded us, just like our act of
willing influences those that are to come. It is this continuation of ‘willing’ from one indi
vidual to the next that the Buddhists understand as reincarnation.
When Schopenhauer wrote The World as Will and Idea he did not have access
to all of the above. Dauer tells us that he only had access to a few fragmentary transla
tions of Buddhist text (7-8) and not much more. For this reason, Schopenhauer’s under
standing of Buddhism remained primarily speculative. According to Dauer, Schopenhauer primarily reconstructed Buddhism from the Upanishads, which were available in a
complete Latin translation. Consequently, in order to retrieve the origins of Schopen
hauer’s transcendental problem we must investigate the Vedic literature instead.
Dauer explains that Schopenhauer himself equated the ‘will’ with the Vedic con
cept of Brahman (13). In Vedic literature, Brahman is an unchanging essence or soul,
from which all individual souls (atman) originate. It is through his association of will with
Brahman that Schopenhauer says: "exemption from death [...] is due only in so far as
[we are] thing-in-itself” (World, 185). In The World as Will and Idea, Schopenhauer follows this idea through by saying that the real nature of the world consists in Brahman
(thing-in-itself) (83). Schopenhauer reinterprets the term Brahman and atman—
unchanging soul—by dissociating it from individualism. The energy that survives death
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(will), for Schopenhauer, is egoless. The Brahmic atman (individual soul), on the other
hand, maintains personal identity after death and eventually transmutes to a new body.
Raymond Marcin tells us that Schopenhauer’s philosophy allows us to "know
something about the ultimate nature of reality” (18)—through the will itself. In Schopen
hauer own words: "the word [will], like a magic spell, is to reveal to us the essence of
everything in nature” (43). Will, as the emanation of the thing-in-itself—or Brahman—is
able to understand its own origin. According to Marcin, we can access the thing-in-itself
because we have two inherent perception points, one that reaches outward into the
world and the other, Schopenhauer’s will, which reaches inward towards the thing-initself (43). Dauer presents a similar suggestion when she says that one cannot "grasp
the absolute” through outward perception, or "ordinary methods of cognition”, and must
seek it through one’s inner perception, or through the will (13). Wicks also supports this
position and tells us that Schopenhauer "acknowledges open-mindedly that mystical,
non-rational experiences—a position he calls ‘illuminism’—might reveal a higher reality”
(37) also through the will. Given this, Schopenhauer can justifies indirect knowledge of
the will as thing-in-itself in spite of the Kantian challenge, which is overwhelmingly pre
sent in The World as Will and Idea.
For Schopenhauer, "philosophy and rational thought in general can have nothing
positive to say about such hypothetical mystical dimensions” (Wicks, 37). For this rea
son, the thing-in-itself is never properly defined or described. Schopenhauer’s philoso
phy will not show us that mystical dimension. To understand the thing-in-itself we must
turn to the notion of Brahman, which Schopenhauer explicitly likens to will.
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According to Singh, Brahman is represented in "the Upanishadic dictum tat tvam
asi, (that thou art) [which] best describes the reality that all things are bound together
and emanate from the same unity” (37). This is the source, the thing-in-itself or in Schopenhauer’s own words: "the inner content, the essence of the world” (World, 177).
The nature of this reality—Brahman—according to Singh is not nonexistence, but
"‘ever-existent and blissfully pure consciousness’” (113). It is a dimension that is desirable and attainable at death. In the monumental Hindu Epic—Bhagavad-Gita—we are
given further insight regarding the relation between inner self—our immortal essence—
and Brahman:
Those with the vision of eternity can see that the imperisha
ble soul is transcendental, eternal, and beyond the modes of
nature. Despite contact with the material body, O Arjuna, the
soul neither does anything nor is entangled. [13.32] (527)
Similarly for Schopenhauer the will does not "entangle” itself with the body. It is always
evasive and remains at a distance. At death it returns to the thing-in-itself (Brahman)—
”pure consciousness” (Singh, 113). In Schopenhauer’s philosophy, this is not an explicit
return but a continuation of the already existing inner state, or as Wicks puts it: "the
thing-in-itself is Will in the most straightforward way” (Wicks, 131) with no explicit differ
ence.
In the subsequent verse of the Bhagavad-Gita, we are told: "the soul situated in
Brahman vision does not mix with the body, though situated in that body [13.33]” (527).
The soul—will—is a distinct entity, or as Singh declares, it is "man’s inner being that is
untouched by death” (124). For, as Wicks affirms, will is the thing-in-itself presented
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“translucently through the thin veil of time” (131). Schopenhauer confirms this in his Es
says and Aphorism:
How can one believe that when a human being dies a thingin-itself has come to nothing? Mankind knows, directly and
intuitively, that when this happens it is only a phenomenon
coming to an end in time, the form of all phenomena, without
the thing-in-itself being affected thereby. (Aphorism IV)
As thing-in-itself we intuitively apprehend our own immortality. It is only as humans—or
what Schopenhauer calls principium individuationis—that we doubt it.
This inner knowledge—will knowing itself as thing-in-itself—is the closest form of
rational mysticism. This intimate connection between “will” and “thing-in-itself” is how
“Schopenhauer explains [our inner] confidence against death” (Singh, 123). Singh calls
this a “strange confidence that defies the intellectual awareness of possible and certain
death” (123). This confidence is available as a deeply rooted subjective truth that defies
objective experience (Singh, 123), or the will itself. It is this will, which according to
Schopenhauer is the true essence of an individual, that generates our intuitive confi
dence against death. The will is connected to the thing-in-itself, the real essence of the
world (World, 83). In this line of reasoning, every individual is directly linked to the
source itself. For this reason, fear of death in unnatural. For Brahman does not die,
Braham is. Likewise, the will does not die, the will is.
In spite of his persistence in denying the self, Schopenhauer’s will lacks any posi
tive or negative definition. Dauer’s work is crucial here, she tells us that Schopenhauer
had reconstructed Buddhism from Brahmanism (7-8). Knowing this, many of the blanks
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left by Schopenhauer can be filled by analyzing Schopenhauer through the veil of Vedic
literature itself.
The ego, as a transient identity that ends at death, is different from will or Brah
man that survive death. That which continues in a new reincarnation, in the Vedic texts,
is an emanation of the original self, now found in a new context. Schopenhauer’s will is
omnipresent in all beings (World, 21). It exists in the current self as well as in all future
beings. The thing-in-itself connects all beings. It is the expression of a universe that is
looking back upon itself through individual identities, or melting ice cubes in a glass of
water, as Wicks would call it (37).
Schopenhauer’s denial of individuality is not a denial of transcendence, but a de
nial of illusory reality. The self extends beyond death in will; for the self preceded death
in will (Essays, Aphorism II). For Schopenhauer, it is the individual, the current ego, that
does not exist. The inner essence of self is transcendent, and exists beyond time as
thing-in-itself. It is this essence, which we most deeply identify with, and which trans
cends the material realm of illusion, (Essays, Aphorism III) that survives death. For this
reason Schopenhauer’s philosophy allows for the survival of self in the most intimate
manner (Singh, 123).
The Vedic literature presents a similar idea in its description of atman. Atman
survives death, but leaves the individual behind. It lives again in a new body as that
most intimate part that does not blend with the physical body (Bhagavad-Gita, 527).
Schopenhauer’s will lives simultaneously in all people at all times. It comes into being
and cessation only in the realm of temporal reality (Essays, Aphorism III; World, 22).
Although the definitions differ at face value, atman is present in everything through
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transmutation. Likewise, Schopenhauer’s will is present in everything through the illusory nature of time (World, 83). Both atman and will survive death and return to the thingin-itself or Brahman as that most intimate part of self.
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